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TORTS IN MISSOURI-1957*
GLENx A. McCLEARY**

As our relationships continue to become more and more complex

in an ever changing society, tort law must continue to show an elasticity
in recognizing new claims. The automobile brings the driver into infinitely more relationships than the slower vehicle of the prior period.

Likewise, the risks of producing injuries by one spouse on the other
before the days of the automobile usually were not so great. The policy
of upholding the marital relation weighed more heavily than the need
for compensation for the tort committed, and courts approved the reasoning that due to the marital relation, the husband and wife were one
juristic person, and one could not commit a tort on oneself nor could one
sue oneself in tort. The married women's acts together with the seriousness of the injuries resulting from automobile accidents are causing the
courts to re-examine the doctrine that one spouse cannot sue the other
in tort, particularly in certain situations which would not strain the
marital relation. Intentional and willful injuries arise when there is
little left of the relation between the spouses. Instances of simple negligence place no strain on the relation where there is insurance to ease
the feeling of blame. Our court recognized this where it was an atte-

nuptial tort, the parties marrying two days later.
Another step in this direction was taken in Ennis v. Truhittel in an
action against the administrator of the estate of plaintiff's deceased
husband for negligence in the operation of an automobile in which the
wife was a passenger and the husband the driver, and for willful, wanton
and intentional wrongdoing, the court en banc holding that the action
was maintainable. The husband being dead, the court recognized that

*This Article contains a discussion of selected 1957 Missouri court decisions.

**Professor of Law, University of Missouri.

1. 306 S.W.2d 549 (Mo. 1957) (en banc), 23 Mo. L. Rv. 366 (1958). Judge Eager
dissented on the ground that the rule of strict disability, which forbids a wife to
sue her husband in tort, should not be "abruptly abandoned" by judicial decision;
instead the change should be made by the legislature. He admits that there are
somewhat logical arguments in favor of change, but he fears "far-reaching implications" beyond the automobile cases where "the liberalizing of this rule of disability
has been 'encouraged by the presence of liability insurance .

. .

."'

For a case

abrogating the common law rule, see Leach v. Leach, 300 S.W.2d 15 (Ark. 1957),
23 Mo. L. Rzv. 103 (1958).
(453)
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"the reasons of policy upon which the rule is based, the fact of their
'2
being husband and wife, have vanished."
More frequently, cases are appearing for injuries suffered in accidents involving aircraft. They show the ever expanding area of tort law
and, at the same time, illustrate the capacity of common law principles
to apply to new situations.
In reviewing the negligence cases, it has seemed to the writer that,
perhaps, this article might with some propriety, be labelled a study of
instructions, for the cases which have been appealed are based mainly
upon the contention that prejudicial error has been committed in the
giving, or in the refusal to give, certain instructions. Many of the cases
have been reversed on this ground and a second trial necessitated.
There does not seem to be much contention about the law involved;
instead it is over the proper hypothesization of the facts to aid the jury.
The court approved an earlier decision which pointed out that "the
practice of sprinkling quantities of 'if so', 'if any' or 'if you so find' after
each hypothesis in an instruction tends to make it confusing and unintelligible.... ."3 In Nichols v. Steffan,4 the court approved an instruction
in which, after the initial "if you find and believe"5 heading, the defendant separated every other fact submitted in the instruction from all
others with "and". The appellant had contended that the jury would
be misled in determining the question of fact presented by concluding
that the disputed fact in question was assumed to be true. The court
did not agree with this contention and said that the word "and" was
a conjunction and "as used in the instruction joined all of the facts
hypothesized . . . after the words 'if you find and believe from the
evidence.' "6

I. NEGLIGENCE
A. Duties to Persons in Certain Relations
1. Possessors of Land
While store proprietors may not be negligent in failing sufficiently

2. 306 S.W.2d at 550.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Nichols v. Steffan, 299 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Mo. 1957).
299 S.W.2d 417 (Mo. 1957).
Id. at 420.
Ibid.
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to illuminate a parking lot maintained for customers, if there is some
other condition or object combined with the lack or insufficiency of
light which creates the hazard, liability may be found. In Dean v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,7 a customer made a submissible case for the jury for
injuries sustained in a fall, while carrying groceries from the store to
his car in the parking lot, when he tripped over a fifteen-inch wire hoop
from a banana crate."
2. Carriers
There was the usual number of cases brought by employees against
railroads under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. However they
presented no very unusual factual situations arising from an alleged
failure to provide a reasonably safe place to work. These cases are noted
below.9

7. 300 S.W.2d 431 (Mo. 1957). The trial court had set aside a verdict for the
customer and had entered judgment for the store and manager and, in the alternative, had sustained a motion for a new trial. The judgment was reversed and the
cause remanded.
8. Other cases predicated on the liability of store proprietors to invitees
Wattels v. Marre, 303 S.W2d 9 (Mo. 1957) (falling on a step where the floor to
the tavern was lower than the floor of the dining room with a step between);
Vogrin v. Forum Cafeterias of America, 308 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. 1957) (slippery condition of terrazzo sidewalk due to rain water); Stafford v. Wolferman, Inc., 307 S.W.2d
468 (Mo. 1957) (falling on stairway which was wet because of slush tracked in by
customers in wet snowy weather). In the last case the court reversed a judgment
for the customer and remanded for retrial on the issue of liability, because of error
in failing to instruct that the proprietor had a duty to warn only if the dangers
would not have been known to customers in their exercise of ordinary care. The
discussion by the court of the instruction given in that case makes clear just what
the extent of that duty is and is quite worth reviewing.
9. Roderick v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry., 299 S.W.2d 422 (Mo. 1957), there
was a recovery for injuries resulting from dermatitis allegedly sustained by the
employee through contact with sodium bichromate in a rust inhibitor used in the
cooling system of diesel engines.
Elmore v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 301 S.W.2d 776 (Mo. 1957) was another
dermatitis case arising in the same fashion as in the Roderick case, but recovery
was denied for error in instructions for the plaintiff which submitted a finding that
the places where the employee worked were not reasonably safe places of employment due to the presence of sodium bichromate, without requiring a finding of negligence. It was held that an employer may not be held on the theory of having
furnished an unsafe place to work, if the unsafeness is inherent in the work itself,
and is not negligent merely because he knows that the business is of a dangerous
character, yet sets his employee to work at it. Before an employer engaged in a
dangerous business may be liable to an employee, it must appear that the dangerous
condition was not only reasonably subject to being remedied but also that the employer failed to use reasonable care to protect the -employee by taking steps to
remedy or abate the dangerous condition. An employer is not an insurer of his
employees' safety.
In an action for the loss of a railroad brakeman's right eye allegedly occurring
as a result of dust particles lodging therein when he was holding his head out of the
train to watch for a signal, the jury may find that the railroad had a duty to
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3. Automobiles
In Boese v. Love,' 0 the owner of a truck was held for the injuries
sustained by a four year old boy, when he was struck by an automobile
while he was crossing a street, at an intersection, in front of a store
where the view of the driver of the automobile had been blocked
by the parked delivery truck of the defendant. The evidence was held
to warrant an instruction directing a verdict against the truck owner
upon a finding that the truck driver knew or should have known that
the truck, while so parked, was likely to endanger the safety of the boy
while attempting to cross the street from the store, by obstructing the
view of pedestrians by drivers of vehicles as they approached the intersection, and that the truck could have been parked at a place reasonably
convenient in making deliveries without endangering the boy's safety.
The driver of the automobile was found by the jury not to be negligent.
The operator of a truck, which was parked for several minutes at
the curb of the street while unloading deliveries of goods to a retail
merchant, in swinging the rear doors outward and striking a passing
vehicle in an adjoining lane, was held in Teters v. Kansas City Pub. Serv.
Co.," to be "operating" a motor vehicle within the meaning of the
12
statute requiring the highest degree of care.

furnish the brakeman with goggles without cost as a protection against flying particles
while in the performance of his duty. Fitzpatrick v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry.,
300 S.W.2d 490 (Mo. 1957) (reversed and remanded on other grounds).
In Wiser v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 301 S.W.2d 37 (Mo. 1957), the railroad employee sustained injuries when he slipped and fell on a railroad siding while inspecting
cars by reason of the fact that a rock was embedded in ballast on the track.
In Ferguson v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 307 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. 1957) (en
banc), plaintiff was using a sidewalk as a place to clean lamps. In making a running
inspection of passing trains to see if any were loose or dragging or if there were
hot boxes, also a part of his duties, he stepped backward from the tracks and off
the sidewalk into a ditch or water drain about four feet deep at the edge of the sidewalk. It was not necessary to step off of the sidewalk to make this inspection.
In directing a verdict for defendant on the issue of whether or not this was an
unsafe place to work, the court held there was no negligence in failing to provide
a guardrail at this point for the protection of employees (dissenting opinion by
Judge Hollingsworth).
10. 300 S.W.2d 453 (Mo. 1957). For another case in which this question of
liability has been presented, see Domitz v. Springfield Bottlers, Inc., 359 Mo. 412,
221 S.W.2d 831 (Mo. 1949), 16 Mo. L. REV. 191 (1951).
11. 300 S.W.2d 511 (Mo. 1957). The issue was the contributory negligence of
the operator of the truck.
12. A submissible case may be made against a defendant in a collision which
occurred between defendant's car while being driven on defendant's right hand side
of the highway and plaintiff's car being driven on his left hand side of the highway
when the latter car was trapped between a truck plaintiff was passing and defendant's
oncoming car. In Nelms v. Bright, 299 S.W.2d 483 (Mo. 1957) (en bane), a jury

case was made out on the ability of the defendant, after he actually saw this
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4. Aircraft
A judgment for the plaintiff was reinstated, in Cudney v. Braniff
Airways, Inc.,' 3 for injuries sustained by an airline passenger when she
was thrown from her seat during a severe downdraft while the airplane
was passing through a thunderstorm. Negligence was alleged in flying
through the storm after the pilot had been forewarned by scientific
weather information. The case is an important contribution to the case
law in this area of liability in that it shows what detailed facts a plaintiff
4
may be able to prove in support of his allegations of specific negligence.'
At the first trial of the case, plaintiff had attempted to rely upon the
doctrine res ipsa loquitur, but the court held that the doctrine was not
applicable in this type of situation, remanding the case so that the
plaintiff might plead specific negligence.' 5
Common law principles of negligence applicable to torts on land
were prescribed to determine liability for personal injuries and property
damage sustained in Hough v. Rapidair,'6 when plaintiff's airplane
crashed following an attempt to avoid a near mid-air collision with
defendant's plane in the traffic pattern at a municipal airport. The
evidence was held sufficient for the jury on the question of negligence
of the pilot of defendant's airplane in failing to maintain a lookout for
and to avoid other air traffic to the right of the airplane and aircraft

situation, to stop his car before reaching the point of the collision or to slacken his
speed sufficiently to have avoided the collision.
For an instruction for the defendant where, in an effort to avoid an imminent
head-on collision with the plaintiff's car being driven on plaintiff's left side of the
highway, the driver of defendant's truck turned to his left, see Morris v. Baggett
Transportation Co., 306 S.W.2d 445 (Mo. 1957).
An instruction in Martin v. Turner, 306 S.W.2d 473 (Mo. 1957), that any person
operating an automobile upon the public highway was required to use the highest
degree of care that a very careful person would use under like or similar circumstances to prevent injury or death to persons on such highways and the absence
of such care constituted negligence, was held prejudically erroneous as it fell far
short of the requirements of the statute defining the duty of such persons.
13. 300 S.W.2d 412 (Mo. 1957), 23 Mo. L. REV. 100 (1958).
14. The plaintiff was able to show the weather forecast given to the pilot before
the take-off; the actual weather conditions encountered before the sudden lurch;
the weather conditions which gave warning of the likelihood of encountering downdrafts on the course which the plane was following; the custom of pilots to avoid
flying through such conditions as were forecast, or to reduce speed; the discretion
of the pilot to deviate from the course and to reduce speed, neither of which being
attempted here; and other facts.
15. Cudney v. Midcontinent Airlines, Inc., 363 Mo. 922, 254 S.W.2d 662 (Mo.
1953) (en banc), 18 Mo. L. REv. 326 (1953). Between the two trials Midcontinent
Airlines was merged with Braniff Airways.
16. 298 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. 1957).
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making a final landing approach. After a verdict for the defendant, the
trial court sustained plaintiff's motion for a new trial which, on appeal
by the defendant, was affirmed. The plaintiff in his petition alleged
negligent operation of aircraft in violation of the Air Traffic Rules of
the Civil Air Regulations promulgated by the Civil Aeronautics Board,
and the trial court, in giving plaintiff's principal verdict-directing instruction, instructed the jury that the violation of such rules was negligence.
On this appeal the court held that violation of these rules was not to
be considered negligence as a matter of law, but that the pertinent rules
promulgated by federal authority in promoting safety in flight and in
developing and regulating air transportation "were properly considered
in evidence and were of value to the trial court and to the jury in submitting and determining the issues of negligence in failing to take the
precautions commensurate with the dangers to be reasonably appre17
hended in the shown circumstances of this case."'
5. Telephone Service
A new question of liability in Missouri was presented in Jennings
v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,' 8 where notice of the emergency of
fire was given to the defendant telephone company, but the operator
negligently failed to connect the subscriber with the fire department,
thereby delaying the arrival of the firemen with fire-fighting equipment.
Due to the smoke in the house, the plaintiff alleged that the number of
the fire department could not be ascertained from the telephone book;
that the plaintiff advised the operator of her name and address, of the
fire, smoke and emergency; that plaintiff requested the operator to
connect her with the fire department; that the operator negligently failed
to connect the plaintiff with the fire department or otherwise give notification of the emergency and of plaintiff's request to the fire department;
that ten minutes later another attempt was made with the same result;
that a third effort was made ten minutes after the second attempt and
this time plaintiff was connected with the fire department which responded immediately, arriving in two or three minutes after receipt

17. Id. at 383. The court further said, "and we see no reason that a trial court
in its discretion should not permit pertinent rules to be read into evidence; or that
a violation of the substance of pertinent rules should not be hypothesized for a
jury finding of negligence."
For negligence in failing to maintain sufficient airspeed on take-off, resulting
in a crash of the airplane when it stalled, see Grimm v. Gargis, 303 S.W.2d 43
(Mo. 1957).
18. 307 S.W.2d 464 (Mo. 1957), 23 Mo. L. REv. 369 (1958).
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of the notification and successfully extinguishing the fire. The action was
for the damages resulting from the delay of about twenty minutes.
On motion by the defendant, the trial court had dismissed the action on
the ground that the petition failed to state a cause of action. On appeal,
the order of the trial court was reversed and the cause remanded for
trial so that the question of proximate cause could be presented to a jury.
6. Fright and Shock
A rather extensive review was made in Brisboise v. Kansas City
Pub. Serv. Co., 19 decided by the court en banc, of the problem of
liability in the Missouri decisions for injuries suffered as a result of
negligently producing fright and shock. The husband brought the action
against the streetcar company for the loss of the consortium of his wife,
who was allegedly injured as a result of the fright, shock, terror and
alarm, suffered while driving an automobile when she was caught on the
streetcar track in a traffic snarl where she was threatened with injury by
the manner in which the motorman operated the streetcar in moving
toward her. It was alleged that the operator "sounded or rang the bell
or gong . . .loudly and incessantly, and accelerated and slackened the
speed thereof, and caused a loud and hissing sound until it arrived within
a very short distance of plaintiff's said wife," 20 and, as a result of being
frightened and terrified and put in fear of her life from being caught
in a helpless and inextricable position, she then and there fainted and
suffered an injury to her brain, resulting in total paralysis in her left side.
The action of the trial court in dismissing the petition, on the ground
that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, was
affirmed. The court distinguished various types of cases where relief
might be granted for injuries resulting from mental distress, as where
there was some independent tort committed, or where the conduct of
the defendant toward the plaintiff was willful, wanton, and reckless,
from the instant case of negligently produced fright and shock resulting
in physical injuries, but where there was no "battery or bodily injury
resulting other than from the alleged alarm, shock, terror or fright."'' 1 In
this case the facts alleged refuted the idea of intentional wrongdoing or of
wanton and reckless misconduct on the part of the motorman.

19. 303 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. 1957) (en banc).
20. Id. at 620.
21. Id. at 621.
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7. Humanitarian Negligence
The cases predicated on the humanitarian doctrine are treated
separately in this issue of the REViEw by Mr. Becker, so that special
consideration may be given to this important doctrine in the tort law
22
of lVissouri.
B. Defenses in Negligence Cases
Since a subsequent divisional opinion cannot overrule a prior en
banc pronouncement, the St. Louis Court of Appeals was confronted
with a situation which it described as "difficult and delicate" 23 in passing
upon the question whether, in a case arising in Illinois, the plaintiff
was obliged, under the substantive law of Illinois, to plead and prove
his own due care or lack of contributory negligence, notwithstanding the
Missouri rule making contributory negligence an affirmative defense.
The prior en banc opinion had held this to be a procedural matter; the
subsequent divisional opinion held it to be substantive. In re-examining
24
the problem, the court en banc in O'Leary v. Illinois Terminal R.R.,
expressly approved the position taken in division and overruled earlier
25
Missouri decisions which had been followed in the prior en banc ruling.
Whether the law of Missouri or of Illinois applied in Gerhard v.
TerminalR.R. Assn of St. Louis,2 6 turned on whether accidents occurring
on the Illinois side of a bridge spanning the Mississippi River between
the states fell within the "concurrent jurisdiction" of the courts of each
state under their respective enabling acts. The automobile of the deceased
motorist had struck a curved curbing on the ramp approach to the bridge,
had veered to the opposite side, and had crashed through the bridge
railing. The question presented was whether the accident occurred "on
the river Mississippi" 27 within the intent of Congress as expressed in
the enabling acts. If answered in the affirmative, Missouri law would
apply. The court held that the accident did not occur "on the river
Mississippi" and, therefore, the law of Illinois applied, for the reason

22. See William H. Becker's article entitled "The Missouri Humanitarian Doctrine-1956, 1957" which appears in this issue of the REvIEW.
23. OLeary v. Illinois Terminal R.R., 299 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Mo. 1957) (en banc).
24. 299 S.W2d 873 (Mo. 1957) (en banc). For a more complete discussion of the
problem, see 23 Mo. L. REv. 361 (1958).
25. See also Gerhard v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 299 S.W.2d 866 (Mo.
1957) (en banc).
26. 299 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. 1957) (en banc).
27. Id. at 869.
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"that the term 'concurrent jurisdiction' in this situation 'refers to the
effect of the law of each state within the domain of the other covered
by water divided by the boundary line between the two states, as regards
persons or things on the water concerned or connected in some way
with the use thereof for purposes of navigation . . .' ",28 and "'does not
extend to permanent structures attached to the river bed or the
banks.' "28 However, the court, by dictum, agreed with the conclusion
in an earlier St. Louis Court of Appeals decision,30 in which the injuries
resulted from a collision of two automobiles upon the Illinois side of a
bridge spanning the Mississippi River, and where it was held that the
case fell within the concurrent jurisdiction of Missouri and, thereby,
was governed by the laws of Missouri. In that case the court reasoned
that the bridge, being used as a means of transportation by the parties,
was a situation analagous to the use of a ferryboat. In the instant case
the court felt that the appeals decision represented "an extreme and
liberal application of the doctrine and that the courts will likely be
very reluctant to extend it further."3 1
In an action for injuries sustained in a side-swipe collision, resulting
in the amputation of the plaintiff's arm, the evidence was held sufficient,
in Martin v. Turner 3 2 to authorize a finding that the negligence of the
plaintiff, in driving with his left arm out of the window of his car, was
a direct contributing cause of the loss of his arm, and a refusal of
defendant's requested instruction on this issue of plaintiff's contributory
negligence was prejudicial error.8 3

28. Ibid.
29. 299 S.W.2d at 870.
30. Smoot v. Fischer, 248 S.W.2d 38 (St. L. Ct. App. 1952).

31. 299 S.W.2d at 870.
32. 306 S.W.2d 473 (Mo. 1957).
33. Other cases may be noted in which defensive issues were raised but no new
problems.
Where defendant's instruction submits plaintiffs contributory negligence, plain-

tiffs verdict-directing instruction which permitted the jury to find for plaintiff, if
it found that the negligence of the defendant "'directly caused or contributed to
cause' the automobile collision and injury," was prejudically erroneous where there

was no evidence submitting any cause of the collision other than evidence tending
to show the negligence of defendant and plaintiff. Marsh v. Heerlein, 299 S.W.2d
441 (Mo. 1957).

In the absence of evidence that there was anything said or done by the driver
of the automobile, in the rear seat of which plaintiff was riding as a passenger,
which would indicate to the passenger that the host motorist was not exercising or
would not exercise the highest degree of care in operating the automobile on the
highway, the passenger had no duty to maintain a lookout for other automobiles
approaching the highway from a private driveway. Happy v. Blanton, 303 S.W.2d
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C. Damages in Negligence Cases
In Moss v. Mindlin's Inc.,34 a measure-of-damage instruction while
not commended by the court, was not held to be prejudicially erroneous.
The court observed that detailed and complicated damage instructions
in the usual personal injury case may list items which may be somewhat
overlapping, and it would be better to leave many of the suggested items
for jury argument, thus obviating objections that the instructions
authorized the recovery of double, triple, and quadruple damages. The
instruction in this case was found by the court not to be prejudicially
erroneous for the reason that "the first paragraph tells the jury that it
is to assess damages against the defendant in whatever amount it may
find and believe from the evidence will properly and reasonably compensate the plaintiff for any and all injuries received as a direct result of
the casualty. The items which follow are matters which the jury may
consider in assessing the damages correctly directed in the first paragraph."3 5 The instruction was as follows:
The court instructs the jury that if you find the issues in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant as submitted in
other instructions herein, then it becomes your duty to assess
damages against the defendant in whatever amount you may
find and believe from the evidence would properly and reasonably compensate the plaintiff for any and all injuries received
as a direct result of the fall mentioned in evidence.
In arriving at the damages, if any, you may take into con633 (Mo. 1957). Giving an instruction submitting contributory negligence which
requires a guest passenger to maintain a lookout and to warn the driver of dangerous
situations she could have seen had she maintained a lookout, even though the
driver had been exercising the highest degree of care and there was no reason to
believe he would not continue to do so, constituted error.
The giving of an "accident" instruction in negligence cases where the cause of
the injury is known has long been condemned by the court for the issue is whether
or not defendant was negligent. Rehkop v. Higgins, 306 S.W.2d 516 (Mo. 1957). Where
the cause of the casualty is known the jury should be instructed on the specific issues
of fact presented, otherwise an abstract instruction would tend to confuse the jury.
Thus the giving of an accident instruction is limited to instances where there is
evidence tending to show the cause of the casualty to be unknown.
For an application of the "rescue doctrine" as affecting the usual standards of
contributory negligence, see Dulley v. Berkley, 304 S.W.2d 878 (Mo. 1957).
A judgment for $65,000 in favor of the plaintiff was reversed in Coleman v.
North Kansas City Elec. Corp., 298 S.W.2d 862 (Mo. 1957), where plaintiff, an electrician, had taken a position atop a transformer in close proximity to a high tension
wire knowing of the hazardous position and knowing his employer had reason to
expect it of him.
34. 301 S.W.2d 761 (Mo. 1957).
35. Id. at 768-69.
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sideration and account the following: The nature, character and
extent of the injuries, if any, received by the plaintiff; the
pain, suffering and misery which plaintiff has endured and
which you may find and believe from the evidence he is reasonably certain in the future to endure as a direct result of such
injuries; the physical disability and impairment which you may
find and believe from the evidence that plaintiff has suffered
and may be reasonably certain to suffer in the future as a direct
result of said injuries; such medical, hospital, doctors, nursing,
X-ray bills and other services and charges as shown in evidence,
which you may find and believe from the evidence, was reasonably required to treat the said injuries if any, of plaintiff; any
and all impairment of earning power and ability to work, labor
and earn, if any, and all actual loss of wages and earnings as
you may find and believe from the evidence the plaintiff has
suffered as a direct result of said injuries; together with any
future pain, suffering and disablement which you may find and
believe from the evidence it is reasonably probable plaintiff may
be expected to suffer and undergo as a direct result of said
injuries.36
IH.

UNLAWFUL ARREST

A marshal of a city of the fourth class and his surety were held
37
liable, in City of Advance v. Maryland Casualty Co., for injuries
sustained by the plaintiff because of an unlawful arrest and an assault
made by the marshal and, thereafter, forcibly restraining him of his
liberty. The marshal had seen the plaintiff drive an automobile past
the defendant's home in the city at an alleged excessive speed. Some
four or five hours later, the defendant drove to a place beyond the city
limits, and there, without process, arrested the plaintiff for violation of
the speed ordinance of the city. The section of the statute defining the
powers of marshals of cities of the fourth class provides that he shall
have the power to make arrests without process in all cases in which
any offenses against the laws of the city or of the state shall be committed
in his presence. As interpreted by the court, this section, however, does
not empower the marshal to make an arrest beyond the city limits even
though the offense of speeding was committed within his presence within

the city.

36. Id. at 768.
37. 302 S.W.2d 28 (Mo. 1957).
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